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Intangible Fish and the Gulf of Understanding: Yates v. 
United States and the Court’s Approach to Statutory 
Interpretation 
JOHN M. GARVIN* 
INTRODUCTION 
Is a fish a tangible object? The answer in most cases is obviously “yes.” But in 
Yates v. United States,1 one of the stranger cases of the 2014 term, the Supreme Court 
held that a fish is not a tangible object.2 Or, more precisely, it held that fish are outside 
the meaning of the phrase “tangible object” as it is used in the Sarbanes–Oxley Act 
of 2002.3 
Most of the attention that the Yates case has received thus far relates to what it 
says about prosecutorial discretion and overcriminalization.4 These are important 
topics, to be sure, and this facet of the case deserves all the attention it has received. 
But the Yates decision has interesting, and arguably further-reaching, implications 
about how the Court interprets statutes in general. Because overcriminalization as a 
political issue does not have a strong left- or right-leaning political valance,5 the 
Yates case provides an excellent lens with which to examine the Court’s 
contemporary methods of statutory interpretation. Part I of this Note provides an 
overview of the Yates opinions, and then offers a more thorough argument for its 
relevance to understanding the Court’s current approach to statutory interpretation. 
Part II begins with some critiques of the traditional textualist approach before 
turning to a discussion of where the Court’s approach to statutory interpretation may 
be headed. The Court, for better or for worse, has adopted the vocabulary of the 
textualist approach most famously associated with the late Justice Scalia, 
emphasizing linguistic canons of construction and largely eschewing legislative 
history. But even though, and in some senses because, the Justices have committed 
to speaking the same language, fundamental differences between the Justices 
remain.6 This exposes the inherent flexibility of the textualist approach and its 
capacity to accommodate ideological, normative choices in deciding cases. 
                                                                                                             
 
 *  J.D. candidate, 2017, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. 
 1.  135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015). 
 2.  Id. at 1079. 
 3.  18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012). 
 4.  See infra note 93. 
 5.  See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Right and Left Join Forces on Criminal Justice, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 23, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/24/us/24crime.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/6U25-SSTS] (arguing that both liberal and conservative groups have lent 
legal support to challenge perceived overcriminalization, signaling a conservative break from 
Nixon-era tough-on-crime policies). 
 6.  See infra Part I.A.2. 
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I. THE INTANGIBLE QUALITIES OF LANGUAGE (AND OF FISH?) 
Part I.A provides a brief overview of the factual background of the Yates case, 
followed by a close reading of the Supreme Court’s decision. Part I.B then argues 
the importance of the Yates decision as a barometer of the Court’s attitude towards 
different approaches to statutory interpretation, due to its relatively neutral political 
valence compared to other statutory interpretation cases. 
A. Purpose and Ordinary Language at Odds 
1. Factual Background 
 John Yates’s arrest and conviction stemmed from an August 2007 incident 
when the commercial fishing boat he captained, the Miss Katie, was boarded by 
Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission officer John Jones.7 Onboard, 
Jones noticed several red grouper that appeared to be smaller than the minimum 
length allowable under federal conservation regulations.8 Jones inspected the rest of 
the ship’s catch, measuring fish he believed to be undersized, and found that 
seventy-two grouper were below the minimum twenty inches; all but three were 
between nineteen and twenty inches.9 He separated the undersized fish in wooden 
crates away from the rest of the catch, told Yates to leave the fish separated until the 
boat returned to port, and issued him a citation for possession of the undersized fish.10 
 When the Miss Katie returned to port, Jones remeasured the fish in the crates 
and found that the measurements—still under the twenty-inch requirement—did not 
correspond to the measurements he had taken while previously on the vessel.11 He 
questioned a crew member, who admitted that he had, at Yates’s request, thrown 
overboard the fish Jones had measured, and that he and Yates replaced those fish 
with others from the catch.12 
 While Yates was only subject to civil penalties for possessing the undersized 
fish,13 the attempted cover-up resulted in two criminal convictions for him. Under 
                                                                                                             
 
 7.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1079. The Miss Katie was in exclusively federal waters when 
Jones boarded it; nevertheless, it was within Jones’s jurisdiction to do so—he had been 
deputized as a federal agent by the National Marine Fisheries Service and had the authority to 
enforce federal (as well as state) fishing laws. Id. 
 8.  Id. (citing 50 C.F.R. § 622.37(d)(2)(ii) (2007)). 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. at 1080. 
 12.  Id.  
 13.  Id. at 1079. “Violation of [these federal conservation] regulations is a civil offense 
punishable by a fine or fishing license suspension.” Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 1857(1)(A), (G), 
1858(a), (g) (2012)). However, “[b]y the time of the indictment, the minimum legal length for 
Gulf red grouper had been lowered from 20 inches to 18 inches. . . . No measured fish 
in Yates’s catch fell below that limit. The record does not reveal what civil penalty, if 
any, Yates received for his possession of fish undersized under the 2007 regulation.” Id. at 
1080 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1858(a) (2012); 50 C.F.R. § 622.37(d)(2)(iv) (2009)). 
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18 U.S.C. § 2232(a),14 Yates was convicted of destroying property to prevent a 
federal seizure.15 More controversially, Yates was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1519, 
which provides: 
Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, 
falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible 
object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation 
or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any 
department or agency of the United States or any case filed under title 
11, or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be 
fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.16 
At trial, Yates moved for acquittal on the § 1519 charge, arguing that the statute’s 
origin as a provision of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act limits it to document-related 
offenses.17 The court rejected this argument,18 as did the Eleventh Circuit on appeal.19 
Only the § 1519 charge, and not the § 2232(a) conviction, was at issue when Yates’s 
case made its way to the Supreme Court.20 
 Yates’s argument is an essentially purposivist one: § 1519, as part of the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act, was simply never meant to cover fish. Rather, the type of 
tangible objects included in the phrase “record, document, or tangible object”21 is 
limited to “devices designed to preserve information.”22 What is interesting about the 
Yates case is how little focus the Court places on true legislative history. The 
plurality’s narrow reading of § 1519 in support of Yates’s argument is based 
primarily on the application of traditional linguistic canons of construction. Part I.A.2 
examines the countervailing issues at play in this decision. 
2. The Yates Decision 
 Yates v. United States comprises three opinions: Justice Ginsberg wrote the 
plurality opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Breyer, and Justice 
                                                                                                             
 
 14.  18 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (2012) (“Destruction or removal of property to prevent 
seizure.—Whoever, before, during, or after any search for or seizure of property by any person 
authorized to make such search or seizure, knowingly destroys, damages, wastes, disposes of, 
transfers, or otherwise takes any action, or knowingly attempts to destroy, damage, waste, 
dispose of, transfer, or otherwise take any action, for the purpose of preventing or impairing 
the Government's lawful authority to take such property into its custody or control or to 
continue holding such property under its lawful custody and control, shall be fined under this 
title or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.”). 
 15.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1080. 
 16.  18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012).  
 17.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1080. 
 18.  United States v. Yates, No. 2:10–cr–66–FtM–29SPC, 2011 WL 3444093, at *1–2 
(M.D. Fla. Aug. 8, 2011). 
 19.  United States v. Yates, 733 F.3d 1059, 1061 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 20.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1079. 
 21.  18 U.S.C. § 1519. 
 22.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (No. 
13-7451). 
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Sotomayor; Justice Alito wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment; and Justice 
Kagan wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. 
Although Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas often join in the same opinion, Yates 
marked only the third time in Justice Kagan’s tenure that these four had aligned in a 
5–4 decision.23 Justice Kagan’s dissent hews closely to the textualist approach more 
typically associated with the other dissenting Justices—Justice Scalia in particular.24 
The dissent had, perhaps, an easier case to make in Yates—a fish is a tangible object, 
after all—and so Kagan’s dissent is mostly focused on calling into question the 
arguments of the plurality and concurring opinions.25 Before analyzing how these 
voting blocs may have formed, the logic by which fish were deemed not tangible 
objects warrants further explanation. 
i. Ginsburg’s Plurality 
 Justice Ginsburg’s opinion begins by acknowledging that fish do indeed fall 
within the literal meaning of the phrase “tangible object.”26 But she then makes a 
somewhat more contentious claim: “Whether a statutory term is unambiguous, 
however, does not turn solely on dictionary definitions of its component words.”27 
Quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., she explains that whether certain statutory 
language is ambiguous depends on the context in which the language itself is used 
and on the broader context of the statute as a whole.28  
                                                                                                             
 
 23.  Justice Kagan joined the Court for the beginning of the 2010 term. The first example 
of this bloc in a 5–4 case occurred in Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter, 132 S. Ct. 2181 
(2012), in which the four Justices joined a majority opinion authored by Justice Sotomayor. 
In the 2014 term, prior to the Yates decision, the four dissented in Dart Cherokee Basin 
Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting). For a display of each 
voting alignment in 5–4 decisions for the respective Supreme Court terms 2010–2014, see Stat 
Pack for October Term 2010, SCOTUSBLOG, 52–53 (June 28, 2011), 
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/SB_OT10_stat_pack_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9J9N-BLXQ]; Stat Pack for October Term 2011, SCOTUSBLOG, 56–57 
(June 30, 2012), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/SCOTUSblog_Stat_Pack_OT11_final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/M2BK-L65V]; Stat Pack for October Term 2012, SCOTUSBLOG, 52–54 
(June 27, 2013), http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/SCOTUSblog_StatPack_OT121.pdf [https://perma.cc/5HDJ-
HNHN]; Stat Pack for October Term 2013, SCOTUSBLOG, 62–63 (July 3, 2014), 
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/SCOTUSblog_Stat_Pack_for_OT13.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZW3-
S23E]; Stat Pack for October Term 2014, SCOTUSBLOG, 50–52 (June 30, 2015), 
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/SB_Stat_Pack_OT14.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/45EM-UKYX]. 
 24.  See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and Normative Canons, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 531, 532 (2013) (reviewing READING LAW, ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. 
GARNER (2012) (“Justice Antonin Scalia is the leading theorist as well as practitioner of what 
has been dubbed the new textualism.” (emphasis in original)). 
 25.  See Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1090–1101 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 26.  Id. at 1081. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. at 1081–82 (quoting 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997)). 
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 This claim, that the context surrounding an otherwise unambiguous phrase can 
render the phrase ambiguous, is central to the disagreement between the plurality and 
dissent. Even Justice Scalia, the archetypal textualist, would have agreed that context 
and purpose are appropriate tools for resolving ambiguity or vagueness surrounding 
the meaning of a word or phrase.29 The dissent ultimately argues, however, that the 
phrase “tangible object” is unambiguous and that its plain meaning should thus 
prevail.30 
 From an ahistorical perspective, it seems dubious that any canon of 
construction should lead to the conclusion that a fish is not a tangible object. But 
§ 1519 was enacted as part of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act,31 so it would be an equally 
surprising result to hold a fisherman criminally liable under a statute that was meant 
to punish financial fraud.32 In any case, the Justices deciding Yates found little use 
for an extensive consideration of § 1519’s legislative history, and this Note will 
follow their lead. Ginsburg writes: 
The Sarbanes–Oxley Act, all agree, was prompted by the exposure of 
Enron's massive accounting fraud and revelations that the company's 
outside auditor, Arthur Andersen LLP, had systematically destroyed 
potentially incriminating documents. The Government acknowledges 
that § 1519 was intended to prohibit, in particular, corporate 
document-shredding to hide evidence of financial wrongdoing.33 
 In the plurality’s view, the phrase “tangible object” in § 1519 refers only to 
objects used to record or preserve information, such as servers and hard drives.34 To 
support this narrow reading, Justice Ginsburg points to what she calls “familiar 
interpretive guides.”35 
 First, she points to § 1519’s caption: “Destruction, alteration, or falsification 
of records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy.”36 The caption specifically 
refers to records, and not to “objects” or some other word that would indicate that 
the provision is meant to apply broadly to the spoliation of all physical evidence.37 
                                                                                                             
 
 29.  See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 33 (2012) (“[The ‘fair reading’ approach to interpretation endorsed by the 
authors] requires an ability to comprehend the purpose of the text, which is a vital part of its 
context. But the purpose is to be gathered only from the text itself, consistently with the other 
aspects of its context. This critical word context embraces not just textual purpose but also (1) 
a word’s historical associations acquired from recurrent patterns of past usage, and (2) a 
word’s immediate syntactic setting—that is, the words that surround it in a specific utterance.” 
(emphases in original)). 
 30.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1091 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 31.  H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. (2002). 
 32.  See, e.g., The Enron Collapse: Implications to Investors and the Capital Markets: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., & Gov’t Sponsored Enters. of the H. 
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. (2002). 
 33.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1081. 
 34.  Id. at 1077. 
 35.  Id. at 1083. 
 36.  Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2002)). 
 37.  Id.  
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Additionally, § 1519 is located within § 802 of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, entitled 
“Criminal penalties for altering documents”38—this is the aforementioned “broader 
context of the statute as a whole.”39 The plurality also cites the specificity of the other 
sections within Chapter 73 of Title 18 as evidence that “tangible object” does not 
mean all physical evidence.40 Other Sarbanes–Oxley provisions, however, were 
placed near more general sections of the U.S. Code; the plurality argues that 
Congress could have placed § 1519 among these more general sections if it intended 
§ 1519 to be broadly applicable.41 
 The simultaneous passage of another Sarbanes–Oxley provision, 
18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1), also implicates the long-held surplusage canon. Section 
1512(c)(1) provides:  
 (c) Whoever corruptly 
 (1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other 
object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object's integrity 
or availability for use in an official proceeding; . . .  
. . . . 
 shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or 
both.42 
Yates, the plurality notes, does not dispute that the phrase “other object” in this 
provision does in fact refer to all physical objects.43 Here the plurality does reference 
legislative history, but only to reinforce the primary textual argument: § 1512(c)(1) 
was drafted after § 1519; the expansive definition of “tangible object” proffered by 
                                                                                                             
 
 38. 15 U.S.C. § 802 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 39.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1082 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 
(1997)). 
 40.  Id. at 1083–84 (“Section 1519’s position within Chapter 73 of Title 18 further signals 
that § 1519 was not intended to serve as a cross-the-board ban on the destruction of physical 
evidence of every kind. Congress placed § 1519 (and its companion provision § 1520) at the 
end of the chapter, following immediately after the pre-existing § 1516, § 1517, and § 1518, 
each of them prohibiting obstructive acts in specific contexts. See § 1516 (audits of recipients 
of federal funds); § 1517 (federal examinations of financial institutions); § 1518 (criminal 
investigations of federal health care offenses).”). 
 41.  Id. at 1084 (“Congress did not direct codification of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act’s other 
additions to Chapter 73 adjacent to these specialized provisions. Instead, Congress directed 
placement of those additions within or alongside retained provisions that address obstructive 
acts relating broadly to official proceedings and criminal trials: Section 806, ‘Civil Action to 
protect against retaliation in fraud cases,’ was codified as § 1514A and inserted between the 
pre-existing § 1514, which addresses civil actions to restrain harassment of victims and 
witnesses in criminal cases, and § 1515, which defines terms used in § 1512 and § 1513. 
Section 1102, ‘Tampering with a record or otherwise impeding an official proceeding,’ was 
codified as § 1512(c) and inserted within the pre-existing § 1512, which addresses tampering 
with a victim, witness, or informant to impede any official proceeding. Section 1107, 
‘Retaliation against informants,’ was codified as § 1513(e) and inserted within the pre-existing 
§ 1513, which addresses retaliation against a victim, witness, or informant in any official 
proceeding.”). 
 42.  18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) (2002), quoted in Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1084. 
 43.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1084. 
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the government would make § 1512(c)(1) wholly superfluous, as “any matter within 
[federal] jurisdiction” includes “an official proceeding”; thus Congress would have 
had no reason to draft § 1512(c)(1).44  
The plurality then turns to the language of § 1519 itself, employing the 
well-known canons of statutory interpretation noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis 
to argue for a narrow reading.  
Noscitur a sociis, also called the associated words canon,45 refers to the maxim 
that, “[I]f two or more words are grouped together in a statute, the meaning of a 
particular word may be determined by reference to the meaning of the words 
surrounding it.”46 In the plurality’s application, noscitur a sociis indicates that the 
meaning of the phrase “tangible object” is informed by the verbs “alters, destroys, 
mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in,” and the nouns 
“record” and “document.”47 Thus “tangible object” refers not to any tangible object, 
but rather to tangible objects that share some essential similarity to records and 
documents.48 The prohibited actions in § 1519 similarly influence the meaning of 
“tangible object”: Although “alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, [and] covers up” 
can each refer to most physical evidence, “falsifies, or makes a false entry in” pertain 
to objects that relate to record-keeping.49 
The related canon of ejusdem generis denotes, “[W]hen, as part of an enumeration 
in a statute, general words follow specific words, the general words are presumed to 
be and are construed as restricted by the particular designations; thus, the general 
words include only things of the same kind, character, and nature as those specifically 
enumerated.”50 In this case, the plurality reasons, if “tangible object” truly meant any 
tangible object, why would Congress bother to include the words “record” and 
“document”? 
Justice Ginsburg next addresses the government’s claim, supported in the 
dissenting opinion, that the phrase “record, document, or tangible object” was drawn 
from a 1962 Model Penal Code (MPC) provision (and subsequent reform proposals 
based on that opinion) that employ the language broadly.51 The plurality admits that 
the 1962 MPC provision “prohibited tampering with any kind of physical 
evidence,”52 but it presents two arguments why “tangible object” should nevertheless 
be interpreted more narrowly. First, the MPC provision did not prohibit actions 
specifically related to record keeping—it imposed liability on one who “alters, 
destroys, mutilates, conceals, or removes a record, document or thing.”53 This lacks 
the same relationship to record keeping as § 1519’s “falsifies, or makes a false entry 
                                                                                                             
 
 44.  Id. at 1084–85. 
 45.  See 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 439 (2016); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 29, at 195–98. 
 46.  82 C.J.S. Statutes § 439 (2016). 
 47.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1085–86. 
 48.  Id.  
 49.  Id. at 1086. 
 50.  82 C.J.S. Statutes § 438 (2016); see also 73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 127 (2016); 2A 
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:17 (7th ed. 2015). 
 51.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1087 (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.7(1) (Proposed Official 
Draft 1962)). 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.7(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962)). 
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in” language. Second, the 1962 MPC provision was proposed as a misdemeanor, 
while § 1519 is a felony punishable by up to twenty years in prison.54 The more 
severe punishment associated with § 1519, the plurality argues, indicates that the 
statute was intended to have a narrower application than the proposed MPC 
provision.55 
Finally, the plurality invokes the rule of lenity to buttress its argument.56 The rule 
of lenity insists that, “In interpreting criminal statutes, any ambiguities must be 
construed most favorably to the defendant.”57 The rule, Justice Ginsburg writes, “is 
relevant here, where the Government urges a reading of § 1519 that exposes 
individuals to 20-year prison sentences for tampering with any physical object 
that might have evidentiary value in any federal investigation into any offense, no 
matter whether the investigation is pending or merely contemplated, or whether the 
offense subject to investigation is criminal or civil.”58 Although the government in 
Yates’s case did not seek to impose anywhere close to the twenty-year statutory 
maximum, the plurality here expressed concern that prosecutors would be able to 
impose huge, and hugely disproportionate, punishments under such an expansive 
reading of § 1519. 
ii. Alito’s Concurrence 
Justice Alito’s concurrence is essentially a slimmed-down version of the plurality 
opinion. He eschews the plurality’s discussion of the broader statutory context of 
§ 1519 within the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, the relevance (or lack thereof) of the 1962 
MPC provision, and the rule of lenity. Instead, he opines that Yates “can and should 
be resolved on narrow grounds”59—namely, “the statute's list of nouns, its list of 
verbs, and its title.”60 Justice Alito acknowledges that none of these factors is in itself 
dispositive, but reasons that as a whole they tip the balance of the case in favor of 
Yates.61 
The concurring opinion’s discussion of § 1519’s nouns and verbs follows the 
plurality’s discussion of noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis, and then anticipates 
the dissent’s critiques.62 Beginning with an analysis of § 1519’s nouns, Justice Alito 
agrees with the plurality that the Latinate canons suggest that “tangible objects” 
should be of a type similar to records and documents.63 A hard drive containing 
e-mail and other electronic media, he suggests, is likely the kind of thing intended 
by the phrase, insofar as it would be sufficiently similar to records and documents 
without itself being a record or document.64 Justice Alito’s concurrence also includes 
a compelling explanation for why Congress might have chosen the seemingly 
                                                                                                             
 
 54.  Id.  
 55.  Id. at 1087–88. 
 56.  See id. at 1088. 
 57.  73 AM. JUR. 2D Statutes § 188 (2016). 
 58.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1088 (emphasis in original). 
 59.  Id. at 1089 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  See id. 
 62.  See id. at 1089–90. 
 63.  Id. at 1089. 
 64.  Id. 
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open-ended expression “tangible object” to convey such a narrow meaning: the use 
of broad language, confined to the surrounding context, allows the statute to expand 
to encompass new technologies yet remain consistent with the purpose of the 
statute.65 
Discussing § 1519’s verbs, Justice Alito writes, “Although many of those verbs 
could apply to nouns as far-flung as salamanders, satellites, or sand dunes, the last 
phrase in the list—‘makes a false entry in’—makes no sense outside of filekeeping. 
How does one make a false entry in a fish?”66 But he then concedes that Congress 
needn’t always write statutes such that every verb applies to every noun.67 In this 
case, however, if “tangible objects” refers to a category of nouns that relate to file 
keeping, then each verb seems to apply.68 
 The final component of Justice Alito’s analysis is the title of § 1519.69 Of 
§ 1519’s nouns included in his preceding analysis, the title contains only “records.”70 
If § 1519 had been intended to apply as broadly as the government contends, one 
might expect the title to read “Destruction, alteration, or falsification of evidence . . 
.” instead. But the reference to “records” in § 1519’s title, for Justice Alito, confirms 
his analysis of the section’s “nouns and verbs,”71 giving Yates’s argument the edge. 
iii. Kagan’s Dissent 
 Beyond the fact that Justice Kagan dissented in Yates in the first place, it’s 
somewhat interesting that she authored the dissent, with Justices Scalia, Kennedy, 
and Thomas joining. One imagines that Justice Scalia in particular would have been 
borderline incensed by Justice Ginsburg’s opening claim that “[w]hether a statutory 
term is unambiguous, however, does not turn solely on dictionary definitions of its 
component words.”72 But Justice Kagan instead wrote—with all the wit and humor 
Court observers have come to expect from her,73 if perhaps with an extra dose of 
snark—what is essentially a call to common-sense: A fish is a tangible object. 
 Justice Kagan does not begin her opinion by attacking the plurality’s claim that 
context can introduce ambiguity. She instead writes early in the opinion, “[C]ontext 
confirms what bare text says: All the words surrounding ‘tangible object’ show that 
Congress meant the term to have a wide range. That fits with Congress’s evident 
purpose in enacting § 1519: to punish those who alter or destroy physical evidence—
any physical evidence—with the intent of thwarting federal law enforcement.”74 This 
                                                                                                             
 
 65.  See id. 
 66.  Id. at 1090. 
 67.  See id. 
 68.  Cf. id. 
 69.  See id. 
 70.  See id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012)). 
 71.  See id. 
 72.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1081; see SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 29, at 57 (“[E]xcept in 
the rare case of an obvious scrivener’s error, purpose—even purpose as most narrowly 
defined—cannot be used to contradict the text or supplement it. Purpose sheds light only on 
deciding which of various textually permissible meanings should be adopted.” (emphasis in 
original)). 
 73.  See generally, Laura Krugman Ray, Doctrinal Conversation: Justice Kagan’s 
Supreme Court Opinions, 89 IND. L.J. SUPPLEMENT 1 (2012). 
 74.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1091 (emphasis in original). 
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claim may arguably be overreaching, but the dissent does manage to call into 
question the extent to which § 1519’s internal and external context supports the 
plurality’s narrow reading.  
 In terms of external context, Justice Kagan points to other references to the 
term “tangible object.” She cites a litany of federal and state statutes that include 
some reference to “tangible object” or “tangible thing,” and writes, “To my 
knowledge, no court has ever read any such provision to exclude things that don’t 
record or preserve data; rather, all courts have adhered to the statutory language’s 
ordinary (i.e., [sic] expansive) meaning.”75 The dissent references the 1962 MPC 
provision,76 as anticipated by the plurality, as well as § 1512’s use of the phrase 
“record, document, or other object.”77 Rather than distinguishing § 1519’s scope, the 
dissent argues that these provisions offer more evidence of the proper breadth of the 
term “tangible object.”78  It goes on to argue that “typically ‘only the most compelling 
evidence’ will persuade this Court that Congress intended ‘nearly identical language’ 
in provisions dealing with related subjects to bear different meanings.”79 
 The dissent demonstrates little patience with the plurality’s discussion of 
§ 1519’s title and its placement within Chapter 73 of Title 18. To both arguments, 
the dissent replies that the Court has never used such evidence to override a statute’s 
plain meaning.80  
 In terms of internal context, Justice Kagan notes that “[s]ection 1519 refers to 
“any” tangible object, thus indicating (in line with that word's plain meaning) a 
tangible object ‘of whatever kind.’”81  The dissent also claims that the long list of 
verbs accompanying the phrase further demonstrates the intended broad range of the 
statute.82 
 The dissent then begins its assault on the plurality’s invocation of canons of 
construction. Regarding the rule against surplusage, Justice Kagan argues that a 
broad reading of § 1519 would not render § 1512(c)(1) superfluous because only the 
latter prohibits tampering with evidence in federal litigation between private 
parties.83 The dissent then attempts to cut into the plurality’s noscitur a sociis and 
ejusdem generis analysis—at this point, the charge that context cannot create 
                                                                                                             
 
 75.  Id. at 1091–92. 
 76.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 241.7(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
 77.  18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) (2002). 
 78.   Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1091. 
 79.  Yates, 135 S. Ct. at 1093 (quoting Commc’ns Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 754 
(1988)). 
 80.  Id. at 1094–95 (“I know of no other case in which we have begun our interpretation 
of a statute with the title, or relied on a title to override the law's clear terms. . . . [And a]s far 
as I can tell, this Court has never once suggested that the section number assigned to a law 
bears upon its meaning.” (emphasis in original) (citing SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 29, at 
xi–xvi)). 
 81.  Id. at 1092 (emphasis in original). 
 82.  Id. (“[T]he adjacent laundry list of verbs in § 1519 (‘alters, destroys, mutilates, 
conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry’) further shows that Congress wrote a 
statute with a wide scope. Those words are supposed to ensure—just as ‘tangible object’ is 
meant to—that § 1519 covers the whole world of evidence-tampering, in all its prodigious 
variety.” (citing United States v. Rodgers, 466 U.S. 475, 480 (1984))). 
 83.  Id. at 1095–96. 
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ambiguity begins in earnest.84 And as before, the dissent claims that a proper 
understanding of those canons better supports its argument, because records and 
documents not only store information, but also provide it; records, documents, and 
the wide universe of all tangible objects share a common trait in that they can 
potentially serve as evidence in legal disputes.85 In the dissent’s view, the rule of 
lenity also offers no support to the plurality’s argument, for the simple fact that 
§ 1519 is not ambiguous.86 
 Lastly, the dissent addresses Justice Alito’s concurrence. As his arguments 
mirror the plurality’s, the dissent repeats its criticisms with minor adjustments.87 In 
Justice Alito’s concurrence, he attempts to apply the noscitur a sociis and ejusdem 
generis canons to the case in nontechnical, plain English, by asking, “[W]ho 
wouldn’t raise an eyebrow if a neighbor, when asked to identify something similar 
to a ‘record’ or ‘document,’ said ‘crocodile’?”88 Justice Kagan treats Justice Alito’s 
hypothetical not as reaching out to readers outside the legal profession, but as a 
misunderstanding of the canons themselves: “Courts sometimes say, when 
explaining the Latin maxims, that the ‘words of a statute should be interpreted 
consistent with their neighbors.’ . . . The concurrence takes that expression 
literally.”89 The better question, the dissent suggests, is whether anyone would claim 
that a fish, or a crocodile for that matter, is not a tangible object.90 
 In the end, the dissent does find some common ground with the plurality and 
concurrence. Justice Kagan ends by agreeing that the twenty-year statutory 
maximum under § 1519 provides for the possibility of prosecutorial overreach: “Still 
and all, I tend to think, for the reasons the plurality gives, that § 1519 is a bad law—
too broad and undifferentiated, with too-high maximum penalties, which give 
prosecutors too much leverage and sentencers too much discretion.”91 But where the 
plurality and concurrence employed established canons of construction, albeit 
perhaps applying them more liberally than is typical, to attempt to remedy this 
problem, the dissent throws up its hands, claiming that the arbitrariness in 
enforcement allowable by § 1519’s broad language is in fact a recurring 
characteristic of the federal criminal code.92 
                                                                                                             
 
 84.  See id. at 1097 (“As an initial matter, this Court uses noscitur a sociis and ejusdem 
generis to resolve ambiguity, not create it. Those principles are ‘useful rule[s] of construction 
where words are of obscure or doubtful meaning.’” (quoting Russell Motor Car Co. v. United 
States, 261 U.S. 514, 520 (1923))). 
 85.  See id. 
 86.  See id. 
 87.  See id. at 1099 (“The concurring opinion is a shorter, vaguer version of the 
plurality's.”). 
 88.  Id. at 1089. 
 89.  Id. at 1099 (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 105 
(2000)). 
 90.  See id. 
 91.  Id. at 1101. 
 92.  See id. at 1100–01. 
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B. The Importance of Yates 
 There are several lessons to glean from the Yates decision. As mentioned in the 
Introduction, much of the early literature surrounding the case has been about what 
it tells us regarding the Supreme Court’s attitudes towards overcriminalization and 
prosecutorial discretion.93 But Yates has much farther-reaching implications in terms 
of the way the Court approaches statutory interpretation.  
In 1998, Jonathan Siegel made the prescient observation that “we are all 
textualists now.”94 The Yates decision’s lack of emphasis toward legislative history 
surely bears testimony to the accuracy of Siegel’s statement. On today’s Supreme 
Court, textualist canons account for most of the artillery in closely fought cases.95 
Textualists have rallied around Judge Harold Leventhal’s oft-quoted critique of 
legislative history—that it is akin to “looking over a crowd and picking out your 
friends.”96 Essentially, the textualists charge, legislative history allows judges too 
much freedom to cherry-pick interpretations of legislative purpose that comport with 
their own political dispositions. Yates, however, shows that judges need neither 
legislative history nor compelling political incentives to “pick out their friends.” 
Yates illustrates that mere reliance on textualist canons provides more than enough 
freedom for judges to reach wholly contradictory conclusions.  
II. COMPETING CANONS 
Justice Scalia, with his coauthor Bryan Garner, wrote in their 2012 tome Reading 
Law that “[t]extualism is not well designed to achieve ideological ends, relying as it 
does on the most objective criterion available: the accepted contextual meaning that 
the words had when the law was enacted.”97 In that book, the authors identified fifty-
                                                                                                             
 
 93.  See, e.g., Adeel Bashir, Fish Jokes Aside: Yates Hints at the Court’s View of 
Prosecutorial Discretion, CRIM. JUST., FALL 2015, at 18; Todd Haugh, Overcriminalization's 
New Harm Paradigm, 68 VAND. L. REV. 1191 (2015); John G. Malcolm, Hook, Line & Sinker: 
Supreme Court Holds (Barely!) that Sarbanes-Oxley's Anti-Shredding Statute Doesn't Apply 
to Fish, 2014–2015 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 227 (2015); Wesley M. Oliver, Charles Lindbergh, 
Caryl Chessman, and the Exception Proving the (Potentially Waning) Rule of Broad 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 20 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 68–72 (2015); The Supreme Court, 2014 
Term—Leading Cases 129 HARV. L. REV 181, 361 (2015). 
 94.  Jonathan R. Siegel, Textualism and Contextualism in Administrative Law, 78 B.U. L. 
REV. 1023, 1057 (1998). 
 95.  Cf. Abbe R. Gluck, Comment, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding 
Congress’s Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 73 (2015) 
(“Every major recent statutory opinion, from every Justice on the Court, has relied heavily on 
interpretive canons to decide cases; their rise derives from textualism’s impact on the tools—
text and presumptions, not legislative history and purpose—that virtually all judges now use 
to interpret statutes.”). 
 96.  Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 214 (1983) (citing a conversation with Harold 
Leventhal). 
 97.  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 29, at 16. 
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seven “valid canons” of construction that, if faithfully followed, will minimize 
ideologically motivated judging98 and promote “sound interpretation.”99 
William Eskridge argues that Scalia and Garner’s approach fails to prevent the 
type of normative judging it purports to.100 Complex cases afford judges 
opportunities to select canons that support the result that accords with their 
predilections.101 The choice between canons requires normative judgments, and these 
judgments often hinge on a judge’s assessment of a statute’s purpose.102 In light of 
the Yates decision, this criticism rings especially true. But this line of criticism is 
hardly new—over half a century ago, Karl Llewellyn described how “dueling 
canons” could be used to justify contradictory interpretations.103  
Textualism has become the Court’s dominant approach to statutory interpretation 
despite its long-recognized failure to preclude normative judging. Perhaps the 
ascendency of textualism is merely an historical accident. More likely, other aspects 
of textualism—its fidelity to democratic principals, for example104—contributed to 
its dominance. The Court’s adoption of textualism as its primary interpretive 
approach may still be beneficial, regardless of the reasons for that development. The 
intellectual incompatibility of textualism and purposivism had stymied the discourse 
concerning statutory interpretation. As a shared approach, textualism provides a 
common framework for the Justices to engage the particularities of each case, rather 
than expend energy critiquing each other’s approach. 
A. Karl Llewellyn’s Critique 
 In 1950, Karl Llewellyn published his Remarks on the Theory of Appellate 
Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed.105 In it, 
he lays out twenty-eight established canons of construction and twenty-eight more 
that are directly contradictory.106 For example, he points to the competing canons 
that state, “Titles do not control meaning; preambles do not expand scope; section 
headings do not change language,”107 and “The title may be consulted as a guide 
when there is doubt or obscurity in the body; preambles may be consulted to 
determine rationale, and thus the true construction of terms; section headings may be 
                                                                                                             
 
 98.  See id. at 17. 
 99.  Id. at 29. 
 100.  See Eskridge, supra note 24, at 536 (“One problem is that even their fragmentary list 
of approved canons reveals significant possibilities for judicial cherry-picking.” (footnote 
omitted) (citing SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 29, at xi–xvi)). 
 101.  See id. 
 102.  See id. at 537. 
 103.  See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and 
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950); 
Part II.A infra. 
 104.  See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 29, at xxviii. 
 105.  See Llewellyn, supra note 103. 
 106.  Id. at 401–06. 
 107.  Id. at 403 (citing Westbrook v. McDonald, 44 S.W. 2d 331 (Ark. 1931); Huntworth 
v. Tanner, 152 P. 523 (Wash. 1915); BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS 
§§ 83-85 (2d ed. 1911); SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 339-42 (2d ed. 1904); 
59 C.J. Statutes § 599 (1932); 25 R.C.L., Statutes §§ 266-267 (1919)). 
90 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol.92:77 
 
 
looked upon as part of the statute itself.”108 Given a particular statute, how is a judge 
to decide which to apply? (Scalia and Garner, for what it’s worth, did claim that 
“title[s] and headings are permissible indicators of meaning . . . [b]ut a title or 
heading should never be allowed to override the plain words of a text.”)109 
 Llewellyn claimed that, faced with competing canons, a judge decides cases 
based on “the sense of the situation as seen by the court.”110 Precedent may constrain 
that decision to some extent,111 but the judge can still use the canons as formal 
justifications for the reaching the result that best accords with her “sense” of the case. 
In Yates, the plurality and concurring opinions were guided by the sense that Yates’s 
conduct was not within the intended scope of § 1519, and the dissent was guided by 
the sense that § 1519’s language was unambiguously applicable. Both outcomes were 
reasonable; the former just happened to gain more support. 
B. Speaking the Same Language? 
 Yates v. United States provides several examples of the plurality and dissent 
choosing canons that conflict with each other.112 But the larger differences in that 
case arise not from choosing conflicting canons, but from applying the same canon—
the “ordinary-meaning canon”—differently. Scalia and Garner described the 
ordinary-meaning canon thusly: “Words are to be understood in their ordinary, 
everyday meanings—unless the context indicates that they bear a technical sense.”113 
They called this rule “the most fundamental semantic rule of interpretation.”114 But 
what did the plurality do if not determine that “tangible object” “bear[s] a technical 
sense” in the context of 18 U.S.C. § 1519? 
 Whether ambiguity exists in the term “tangible object” is reducible to a 
judgment call about the purpose of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, and to § 1519 in 
particular. Before textualism made consideration of legislative history taboo, 
congressional hearings, floor debates, Committee reports, and all other forms of 
legislative documents would have at least been available to help inform this 
decision.115 Dismissing legislative history has not made these kinds of questions 
disappear—statutory interpretation has not become any more consistent; ambiguities 
                                                                                                             
 
 108.  Id. (citing Gulley v. Jackson Int’l Co., 145 So. 905 (Miss. 1933); Brown v. Robinson, 
175 N.E. 269 (Mass. 1931); BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS §§ 83-85 
(2d ed. 1911); SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 339-42 (2d ed. 1904); 59 C.J. 
Statutes §§ 598-99 (1932); 25 R.C.L., Statutes §§ 266, 267 (1919)).  
 109.  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 29, at 221–22. 
 110.  Llewellyn, supra note 103, at 397 (emphasis omitted). 
 111.  See id. at 397–98. 
 112.  See supra notes 34–36, 79and accompanying text. 
 113.  SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 29, at 69. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  See, e.g., United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 432 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., 
dissenting) (“A statute, like other living organisms, derives significance and sustenance from 
its environment, from which it cannot be severed without being mutilated. Especially is this 
true where the statute, like the one before us, is part of a legislative process having a history 
and a purpose. The meaning of such a statute cannot be gained by confining inquiry within its 
four corners. Only the historic process of which such legislation is an incomplete fragment—
that to which it gave rise as well as that which gave rise to it—can yield its true meaning.”). 
2016] INTANGIBLE FISH AND THE GULF OF UNDERSTANDING 91 
 
 
(and ambiguity about ambiguities) will always be a facet of statutory language. What 
textualism has done is make the judgment involved in statutory interpretation less 
visible. A judge who is confronted with a statutory provision can make his decision 
about what the outcome of a case should be based on his own political or ideological 
preferences, or what he had for breakfast, or whether traffic was bad—and then pull 
from the multifarious canons of construction ones that will support his decision. 
 But purposivism’s use of legislative history was no less opaque.116 It is beyond 
the scope of this Note to decide a priori whether purposivism or textualism is a better 
approach. Textualism appears to have won that battle for now. The more central point 
is that prior to textualism becoming the dominant approach to statutory interpretation 
on the Supreme Court, the textualists referred to canons of construction and the 
purposivists referred to legislative history. When the two factions were in 
disagreement, they wrote opinions that focused on the systemic shortcomings of the 
other’s jurisprudential approach. Now that textualism has become the dominant 
approach, the Court will be more likely to produce dissenting opinions that engage 
the holding on its own terms, and the Justices to hold each other accountable, so that 
textualism might be able to live up to its initial promise of ideologically neutral, 
sound interpretation.  
 The Justices’ shared reliance on textualism effects these benefits by altering 
the scope of inquiry. When purposivists relied on legislative history and textualists 
relied on canons of construction, the discourse focused too broadly on 
methodological critiques of each side’s approach. By using the shared vocabulary 
and tools of textualism, the Justices can focus their disagreements more narrowly 
over the specific language of a statute and the proper application of canons of 
construction. Widespread acceptance of textualism will not bring an end to legal 
indeterminacy or preclude normative judgment. It will, however, afford Justices an 
opportunity to challenge one another on equal footing, enriching the Court’s statutory 
interpretation jurisprudence. 
 Furthermore, just because Justice Scalia “(co)wrote the book” on canons of 
construction, does not mean that he had a monopoly on their proper application. The 
plurality and concurring opinions in Yates make at least that much clear. But Justice 
Scalia’s role in shaping textualism should not be understated. Speaking at Harvard 
Law School in 2015, Justice Kagan said that Justice Scalia  
is going to go down as one of the most important, most historic figures 
in the Court. And there are a whole number of reasons for that . . . but I 
think the primary reason for that is that Justice Scalia has taught 
everybody how to do statutory interpretation differently. . . . I think we’re 
all textualists now.117 
The Court has much to grapple with in the wake of Justice Scalia’s death, 
including whether textualism will remain the dominant approach to statutory 
interpretation. Nevertheless, Justice Kagan’s explicit endorsement of textualism, and 
                                                                                                             
 
 116.  See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 117.  Justice Elena Kagan, Antonin Scalia Lecture at the Harvard Law School, YOUTUBE 
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her characterization of Justice Scalia’s legacy, are strong indicators that textualism 
is here to stay.  
 The more focused legal discourse regarding statutory interpretation envisioned 
here, comprising debate over the proper application of textualist canons and the close 
parsing of statutory text, resemble the concepts explicated by the great 
twentieth-century Austrian–British philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. In the 
Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein wrote, “For a large class of cases—
though not for all—in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: 
the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is 
sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.”118 In other words, usage plays a large 
part in a word’s meaning. Dicta in the Yates decision may influence federal circuit 
and district courts by indicating that a statutory provision’s purpose, and its context 
in a larger statutory scheme, should indeed be thought of as capable of introducing 
ambiguity into an otherwise unambiguous statutory phrase. The canons of 
construction judges employ to determine statutory meanings constantly require 
interpretation of their own, and their meanings continually shift as they are used in 
different cases. 
 This description of “meaning” as mutable and indeterminate might be 
unsettling to some. It shouldn’t be. As Llewellyn realized,119 judges always have and 
will continue to be guided by their “sense” of a particular case. If the Court continues 
to adhere to a textualist approach but accounts for the “shortcomings” of 
textualism—namely, that it does not restrict normative judging like its proponents 
have claimed—Justices in disagreement will have to address and make explicit their 
respective senses of the case. This will lead to greater transparency in the Court’s 
opinions. The formalistic restrictions imposed by textualism as it is practiced today, 
Scalia and Garner’s book being one iteration of these restrictions, guide the Justices 
towards common ground so that even when they disagree, their disagreements will 
have a strong foundation in the text relevant to the case at hand. 
CONCLUSION 
There will always be difficult cases concerning statutory interpretation, and it is 
highly unlikely that there will ever be complete agreement on the court regarding 
how statutes ought to be interpreted. The Supreme Court will likely continue to be 
under textualism’s strong influence for some time to come, and the Yates decision 
indicates that Justices who are later-adopters of textualism’s vocabulary will 
nevertheless play a role in its continued development. 
 Ardent textualists like the late Justice Scalia criticized judicial consideration 
of legislative history on the grounds that it allowed judges too much leeway to make 
normative judgments—it is akin to “looking over a crowd and picking out your 
friends.”120 But textualism does not prevent normative judging either.121 
Nevertheless, the Court’s shared reliance on textualist principles bodes well for 
                                                                                                             
 
 118.  LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 43 (G. E. M. Anscombe 
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 119.  See supra notes 110–111and accompanying text. 
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 121.  See supra notes 100–102and accompanying text, Part II.A. 
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statutory interpretation jurisprudence. It appears that “we are all textualists now,”122 
and the Yates decision is a model of what we can expect from statutory interpretation 
decisions in the future: majority and dissenting opinions that engage fully with each 
other’s reasoning, close readings of statutory text, and narrow focus on the facts of 
the case. The Justices will continue to disagree over the proper interpretation of a 
statute in hard cases, but at least these disagreements will now use mutually 
recognized, valid terms. 
                                                                                                             
 
 122.  Kagan, supra note 117.  
